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Environmental human rights (EHRs) have 
been referenced by different groups, particularly 
scholars, activists, NGOs and international 
organizations (e.g. the United Nations) since their 
recognition at the international level by the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration, which proclaimed that 
“Both aspects of man's environment, the natural 
and the man-made, are essential to his well-being 
and to the enjoyment of basic human rights the 
right to life itself”. This clearly implies that there is 
a direct connection between a safe environment 
and the enjoyment of human rights, which is the 
core argument of EHRs, but the term is still 
currently vague and unclear, as the literature does 
not provide any single, explicit deﬁnition, and 
which has thus been interpreted in different ways 
by different scholars depending on their values 
and priorities. 
Another indeterminate point is related to the 
types of environmental human rights. It is still 
somewhat unclear to, or under debate by, scholars 
as to what types of environmental human rights 
there actually are, or should be, and how they are 
linked to each other. There is no recognition of 
environmental human rights by hard law at the 
international level, but there are many countries' 
constitutions, international soft law documents, 
and regional hard law declarations, which clearly 
recognize different types of environmental human 
rights. This raises the following question: what 
types of EHRs are there?
 In light of the above discussions, this paper 
aims to achieve two fundamental goals. The ﬁrst 
section attempts to determine the true scope of 
environmental human rights, or how we can deﬁne 
EHRs. The second section attempts to consider 
what types of environmental human rights exist at 
the international and national levels, and how 
these rights are connected with each other. By 
doing so, this paper intends to clarify the direct 
relationship between the environment and human 
rights.  
Human rights are moral principles or norms, 
which are believed to belong to every person, and 
in whose exercise a government may not interfere. 
There are three overarching types of human rights 
norms: civil-political, socio-economic, and 
collective-developmental.
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Environmental human rights (EHRs) have received greater worldwide attention over the years since ﬁrst recognized by 
the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. Approximately 100 countries currently recognize and guarantee EHRs within their 
national constitutions. EHRs have been also used by such diverse groups as academics, social activists, international 
organizations, political parties, NGOs, etc. EHRs, however, are still a long way from being clear as a concept, or may at 
best be considered vague. This may be because different scholars have deﬁned EHRs in different ways. In order to 
broaden and deepen our understanding of EHRs, this conceptual paper will attempt to explain the scope and types of 
EHRs through a critical analysis of the related literature by addressing the following research questions: (1) What is the 
scope of environmental human rights? and (2) What types of environmental human rights are there? It concludes with 
four main types of EHRs, including the right to environment, civil and political rights, and the constitutional and 
procedural rights that are the rights of individuals to preserve the environment in which they live. 
1. DEFINING “ENVIRONMENTAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS”
Kotzé [1] describes the manifestation of human 
rights in an environmental context, and cites three 
common instances: (1) environmental rights; (2) 
environmental human rights; (3) human rights and 
the environment. He concludes that 'human rights 
and the environment' is the best deﬁnition, as the 
term allows for a decidedly holistic consideration 
of the relationship between all human rights. 
The main reason for any conceptual uncertainty 
is the fact that EHRs do not have a rooted history 
[2], which means that they still need time to mature 
before they can be deﬁned in a more deﬁnite way. 
It seems that there is no signiﬁcant conceptual 
difference between these three terms, but it would 
be  more  appropr i a t e  to  use  the  t e rms 
'environmental human rights', as the ﬁrst term 
implies that environmental rights refer to rights of 
the environment and the third term that human 
rights and environment-oriented rights refer to two 
different ﬁelds, when it is commonly accepted by 
scholars that the environment and human rights 
are directly related and cannot be discussed 
separately [3, 4]). In contrast, environmental 
human rights refer to rights of humans related to 
the environment, which is what they essentially 
are.
On the other hand, the scope of EHRs is still far 
from being clear [3, 5]. This may be because 
various scholars have deﬁned EHRs in many ways 
[6, 7]. One commonality amongst these deﬁnitions 
is that environmental human rights are described 
as an expansion or reformulation of existing 
human rights and responsibilities in the speciﬁc 
context of environmental protection [4, 8]). 
According to this deﬁnition, the object of 
environmental human rights encompasses a 
reinterpretation of human rights laws; a new 
substantive right to be protected by state 
institutions; and the protection of the environment 
by state institutions and individuals. 
Environmental human rights are, more 
speciﬁcally, not rights belonging to the 
environment [9], but the rights of humans to 
various environmental protections as they mainly 
derive from a reinterpretation of recognised 
human rights. The right to education, for example, 
does not seem directly relevant to environmental 
protection as it implies that education shall be 
equally accessible to all on the basis of merit, but 
as Boyle and Anderson [5] argue, it can be 
interpreted that education is a powerful means of 
informing people about environmental matters 
and informing people through the enjoyment of 
the right to education can result in better 
environmental decisions in favour of the natural 
world than uninformed ones. This approach links 
the right to education with environmental 
protection, which is deﬁned as EHR. On this basis, 
EHRs depend on how people interpret human 
rights in relation to the environment. 
On the other hand, saying that EHRs belong to 
people does not mean that humans can use the 
environment to satisfy their own needs as they 
wish; they have no direct right to an object (the 
environment), but to the action that allows them to 
protect their environment. EHRs make explicit 
reference to the protection of the environment 
itself, or to the protection of individuals from harm 
originating within the environment [10], which 
requires that a government has an obligation to 
protect those resources on behalf of its citizens and 
future generations. Therefore, it can be seen that 
the main goal of EHRs is to ensure the 
preservation of natural resources rather than the 
sovereignty of humans, the latter of which allows 
for the exploitation of the environment as humans 
see ﬁt.
Hiskes [11] categorises EHRs as emergent 
rights, observing that they arise in response to 
threats to human dignity, a concept which 
underlies all "basic" human rights. It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that this deﬁnition and 
categorisation is agreed upon by many scholars [2, 
12, 13]. However, it can be argued that this 
perspective is anthropocentric, in that it regards 
humankind as the central or most important actor 
[9], and ignores the inherent value of nature [14], 
as well as how humans affect or damage their 
habitat, impair ecosystems, and change the climate 
[15]. Indeed, it can be argued that regarding 
pollution as a threat to only human dignity makes 
the environment “guilty” and human beings 
“innocentˮ, which is an extremely narrow 
approach. It is possible to take an alternative 
stance, which may reﬂect a more ecocentric 
perspective, according to which, in contrast to 
Hiskes [11]'s deﬁnition, environmental human 
rights are emergent in that they arise in response to 
threats to the environment caused by human 
activities that affect all subjects of that ecosystem, 
humans and non-humans [16, 17].
Lercher [18] develops a further and less 
common argument over the scope of EHRs. He 
states that environmental human rights against 
contamination are individual rights, rather than 
group rights. 
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While individual rights are held by a single 
person, group rights are held by the group itself 
rather than by its individual members. The right to 
environment, constitutional rights, civil and 
political rights, and procedural rights are mainly 
held by individuals. The same argument is 
proposed by [19], that environment related rights 
are 'individual rights' that emerge as an extension, 
by way of interpretation, from other expressly 
recognised human rights – such as the right to life 
and health. It seems reasonable to categorise 
EHRs as individual rights due to the fact that they 
recognise the liberties of individuals and award 
them the right to life in a safe environment. 
Secondly, any disproportionate impact to the 
environment is, equally, an effect on an individual 
and his or her rights. Fukushima nuclear accident 
in 2011, for example, poses risks to residents' 
rights to life, health, property, and access to safe 
food and water in the region. In addition, 
traditionally, one of the main purposes of the 
doctrine of human rights has been to protect 
individuals from the power of groups, such as 
states [20]. Human rights are strongly associated 
with the concept of individualism. Thus, 
environmental human rights can be viewed as an 
effective tool for individuals to use against any 
state policy that threatens the environment on 
which they are physically dependent. 
Conversely, the individualistic form of 
environmental human rights is not without 
exception. it would be arguably wrong to view 
environmental human rights as truly individual, as 
they can sometimes only be held by groups [11]. 
Arguments in favour of this view have been 
proposed by Boyle [21] who states that as 
environmental quality is a collective or solidarity 
right, environmental human rights can give 
communit ies ,  or  “peoples”,  rather  than 
individuals, the right to determine how the 
environment and natural resources should be 
protected and managed. It does not seem wrong 
that a safe environment is a collective purpose that 
people would like to achieve by exercising their 
environmental human rights, but this does not 
change the fact that environmental human rights 
that aim to protect the common home of people – 
the environment – are held by all individuals rather 
than a group. Cullet [12] take thus argument 
further, suggesting that the right to environment is 
an individual right not only for existing people but 
that one must also consider the rights of future 
generations, whose interests must be similarly 
taken into account. As we cannot, he argues, 
identify whose individual members, then the right 
is given to a group, the so-called future 
generations, but he ignores the fact that the term 
addresses neither existing people nor future 
generations as rights holders. They are merely 
used to deﬁne the time period that rights holders 
live or will live. EHRs are, therefore, rights of 
individuals rather than groups.
There is no speciﬁc right to environmental 
protection guaranteed by law at the international 
level [22]. However, this idea is not far away, and it 
is interesting that a distinct substantive right to 
environmental protection may be established as 
part of international law in the near future, as 
EHRs are increasingly being recognised by 
international, local and domestic law, such as the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration and 1992 Rio 
Declaration [4, 23]. The literature illustrates four 
main approaches to EHRs, which are not entirely 
mutually exclusive [24, 25]: ﬁrst, mobilising civil 
and political rights to achieve environmental ends; 
secondly, reinterpretation of existing human rights 
(constitutional rights); thirdly, procedural rights, 
and lastly, creating new rights explicit to the 
environment [5], all of which largely remain an 
issue of philosophical debate.
A right to environment implies that a safe 
environment is one of the basic human rights to 
which all human beings are entitled because the 
environment is accepted as a basic human need; a 
provider of the air, water and food that are essential 
for human survival. That is, all people depend on 
the environment in which we live. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS
Figure 1. Types of Environmental Human Rights
a) A Distinct Right to Environment
Int J Agric Environ Food Sci  (2017) 1: 38-48
A safe environment has been increasingly 
recognised as a human right by countries all over 
the world. At the national level, over 90 countries 
(such as Brazil, South Africa, Canada and India) 
guarantee a distinct right to environment in their 
own constitutions, obligating countries to preserve 
ecology, and giving citizens the opportunity to 
enjoy a healthy environment [3], but this does not 
mean that people fully realise this right. In terms of 
recognition, it appears that the right to a clean and 
healthy environment is assuming a higher degree 
of relevance. There is, however, no legally 
enforceable right to the environment at the 
international level. As the environment is 
everyone's home [25], and environmental issues 
such  as  ma jo r  nuc lea r  acc iden t s  have 
transboundary impacts on both people and the 
non-human world, the debate in the literature 
revolves around whether we should have a right to 
the environment that can be realised on a global 
scale [5, 12]. As a right to the environment has both 
advantages and disadvantages, this can be 
considered either negatively or positively 
depending upon how a given scholar might 
perceive and weigh its weaknesses and strengths.
The discussion over a distinct right to 
environment is not without controversy, as there 
are both advantages and disadvantages. Advocates 
of the argument, for example Hayward [26] in the 
book “Constitutional Environmental Rights”, 
argue that the right to an adequate environment is a 
genuine and ecologically sound right that should 
be provided in the constitution of any modern 
democratic state. The latest developments are in 
favour of Hayward [26]'s suggestion that over 90 
countries, which can be found in their own 
constitution or the African Charter (which is a 
binding regional human rights document) 
guarantee the right to a safe and/or clean 
environment. Mann [27] takes a universal view 
and states that an internationally applied right to 
environment is needed to reduce the increasing 
number of environmental issues. Hancock [6] 
develops a more speciﬁc approach and suggests 
that the recognition of two particular rights, the 
right to an environment free from toxic pollution 
and ownership of natural resources, would protect 
human beings from harm to the environment. 
Thorme [28] agrees, but takes a highly pessimistic 
view that if this new right is not soon guaranteed, 
the Earth will ultimately become uninhabitable 
and people would disappear. Of course, 
recognition of such rights would bring some 
advantages to environmental protection. 
However, as Boyle and Anderson [5] argue, this 
does not mean that a right to environment is the 
only way to preserve both nature and human 
existence; well-protected civil and political 
human rights, for example, can also be effectively 
used to address environmental issues. As a rebuttal 
to this point, Thorme [28] ignores the fact that the 
planet, historically speaking, exists and was 
habitable for millions of years without new – 
indeed, any –distinct right to environment. 
Additionally, procedural and civil and political 
r igh ts  can  a l so  be  e ffec t ive ly  used  in 
environmental matters without recourse to a 
distinct right to environment. A right to 
environment is, therefore, not the only way to 
achieve environmental protection.
The main advantage of the right to environment 
is that a distinct right to environment, Gellers [4] 
argues, could be effectively used to address 
environmental issues affecting human life. The 
opposing view is also compelling. Pevato [29] 
discusses how if the ultimate goal of a right to 
environment is to give moral rights to concerned 
groups to raise only their concerns about 
environmental issues, then this can in fact be 
encouraged without any expressly recognised 
right to environment. Boyle [21] takes this 
argument further and claims that the right to 
expression, for example, is a far more effective 
way of enabling victims of environmental matters 
to raise their objections than a right to 
environment. A right to environment, however, 
may have more effective advantages in favour of 
nature. A rights-based approach to environmental 
protection would place states under the obligation 
to secure a clean environment for their citizens 
because this would demand positive state action to 
guarantee minimum standards towards protecting 
the right to environment [30]. Being in favour of 
the latter argument, Eacott [31] emphasizes on that 
recognition and enforcement of a right to 
environment would necessitate the creation and 
implementation of stronger, more comprehensive 
national and international laws of environmental 
protection. 
Ziemer [32] takes the strong anthropocentric 
perspective that linking human rights to the 
environment creates a rights-based approach to 
environmental protection that places the people 
harmed by environmental degradation at the 
centre of the issue. Indeed, a right to environment 
may oblige states to conserve and protect nature
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because responsibility to protect human rights 
resides ﬁrst and foremost with the states 
themselves. According to the International Law 
Commission, working on responsibility of states 
for internationally wrongful act and in conjunction 
with the implementation of the international 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
rights, states have a threefold responsibility; (1) 
States must take positive action to facilitate the 
enjoyment of basic human rights; (2) States must 
refrain from interfering with or curtailing the 
enjoyment of human rights (3) States must protect 
individuals and groups against human rights 
abuses. This right becomes a legal weapon of 
concerned citizens to force their states to secure 
minimum s tandard  to  en joy  a  r igh t  to 
environment; this clearly may serve in favour of 
environmental protection.
On the other hand, such an approach is not 
without problems, in particular with respect to 
implementation of such a right in a practical sense. 
A distinct substantive right to environment seems 
unenforceable [21, 33]. Some scholars, such as 
Boyle and Anderson [5], argue that a right to 
environment should be added to internationally 
recognised rights, as environmental issues are 
transboundary. They are partly correct insofar that 
major environmental issues such as nuclear 
accidents have worldwide implications. Their 
suggestion is, however, not convincing because 
opponents mainly argue that the practical 
implementation of a global substantive right to 
environment is highly challenging as it is not clear 
how the right to environment can be measured, 
protected, audited, and judged at the international 
level. This does not seem achievable as daily 
activities, directly or indirectly, contaminate the 
environment on an ongoing basis e.g., smoking, 
which is purported to cause 600,000 deaths 
amongst non-smokers annually [34]; using 
transportation which burns most of the world's 
petroleum [35]; the growing use of plastic 
products and increased global meat consumption. 
These are some regular, common activities 
performed by people in the modern world. If 
people have the right to a healthy environment, 
and if these and similar activities pollute nature, 
then unarguably the next step would be to discuss 
how to stop them. It seems utopian, but in practice 
the right to a healthy environment requires the 
need for action that protects it from any human 
activities that pollute nature. This is a theme taken 
up by Shelton [33], who states that, “no justiciable 
standards can be developed to enforce the right, 
because  o f  the  inheren t  var iab i l i t y  o f 
environmental conditionsˮ. Thus, the boundaries 
of the right to a healthy environment are undeﬁned 
and vague, while its actual implementation 
appears to be challenging and complex at an 
international level. This may be the main reason 
why there is still no distinct right to a healthy 
environment at the international level. 
Secondly, it is argued that cultural relativism 
would be an obstacle to achieve a distinct right to 
environment at the international level. Handl [36] 
a r g u e s  t h e  r i g h t  t o  e n v i r o n m e n t  o n 
epistemological grounds, claiming that cultural 
relat ivism would be an obstacle to the 
implementation of substantive components of the 
expansive right to environment at the international 
level. The notion of cultural relativism was 
developed by Franz Boas in 1911, which 
emphasises that no moral principles can be formed 
that will apply to all cultures because human rights 
are themselves culturally dependent [37]. 
Donnelly [38] claims that cultural relativism is an 
undeniable fact; that is, culture is an important 
source of the validity of a moral human right. The 
opposing viewpoint is universalism, which 
regards human rights as a single universal concept. 
The modern system of the international human 
rights framework is indeed based on the concept of 
universalism, which means that human rights are 
an entitlement of all human beings regardless of 
their culture, religion, age, gender, etc. [39], but 
this is still under debate. Zechenter [40], for 
example, argues that universalism is merely an 
uncritical, ethnocentric Western conspiracy 
designed to undermine non-Western cultures. 
Similarly, Perusek [41] deﬁnes universalism as 
Western traditionalism that ignores the diversity of 
cultures worldwide. It appears true that the UDHR 
Universal Declaration, for example, is rooted in 
political landmarks in Western history, such as the 
Magna Carta of the United Kingdom (1215), the 
French Revolution (1789) and the American Bill 
of Rights (1791). Nevertheless, the right to 
environment is not recognised by the UDHR [42]. 
Additionally, the ﬁrst binding regional document 
recognising a right to environment is the African 
Charter; the origins of EHRs may not be rooted 
purely in Western culture.
Some scholars argue that EHRs should be 
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Rights: Constitutional Rights
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added to internationally recognised human rights 
to protect human rights, wellbeing and dignity 
from environmental harm. While Thorme [28] 
suggests the recognition of a right to a healthy 
environment, Hancock [6] offers the right to an 
environment free from toxic pollution and 
ownership of natural resources as a solution to the 
issue. As Woods [25] points out, the key argument 
is not recognition of these rights as they are 
already implicit in internationally recognised 
human rights. On the basis of this argument, there 
is no need for separate EHRs because well-
established and legally enforceable human rights 
require a safe environment. They are also referred 
to as the constitutional rights to a healthy/clean 
environment [43].
There are a great number of supporters of this 
argument. Olawuyi [44] and Alfredsson and 
Ovsiouk [45], for example, argue that the 
realisation of certain well-established substantive 
human rights, such as those relating to life, food, 
health, is inherently dependent on the successful 
management of the environment.  Nickel [46] 
explains the reasoning behind this argument and 
states that it is not possible to protect human rights 
without a safe environment because the most 
severe effects of pollution, toxic wastes, and 
inadequately processed sewage result in the 
sicknesses and deaths that undermine recognised 
rights. This is a relatively narrow perspective 
because some environmental issues – particularly 
nuclear accidents – signiﬁcantly affect the lives of 
individuals. Pathak [47] applies basic needs theory 
in that the lack of good quality air, water and food 
as provided by the environment is the greatest 
obstacle to the fulﬁlment of the right to life and 
health. He also acknowledges the trap that it would 
be narrow-minded to limit any impact to the 
environment to purely those of life and health, as 
any such impact would also pose risks to the right 
to food and water. 
It seems that this approach does not attempt to 
set out any new vision for the relationship between 
the two, but instead merely touches on the 
interconnection between the protection of the 
environment and the fulﬁlment of human rights, 
which have in any case been recognised since the 
1972 Stockholm Declaration. The advantage of 
this argument, however, is, as Thorme [28] argues, 
that it demands positive state action in order to 
guarantee minimum environmental standards for 
human rights because it is the responsibility of 
states to take essential steps to protect 
constitutional rights such as the right to life. For 
example, Article 27b of the Constitution of 
Uganda states that: “The State shall ensure that 
...all Ugandans enjoy rights and opportunities and 
access to education, health services, clean and 
safe water, decent shelter, adequate clothing, food, 
security and pension and retirements beneﬁtsˮ 
[43]. In this sense, environmental protection 
becomes a legal, rather than moral, obligation for 
states in order to protect constitutional human 
rights such as the right to water, food, health, 
property, etc. Similarly, Ziemer [32] argues that 
linking human rights to environment issues creates 
a rights-based approach to environmental 
protection that enables citizens to force their 
governments to preserve nature in order to realise 
enjoyment of recognised substantive human 
rights. If enforcement bodies [5] explicitly 
recognise such a relationship, then environmental 
criteria may be directly incorporated into the 
monitoring and enforcement of human rights. His 
argument seems correct in that this may arguably 
depend on values or environmental awareness of 
judges who may, or may not, link the two. In other 
words, there is no guarantee that enforcement 
bodies may not link the two, although others 
maybe will. Environmental human rights, 
therefore, are implicit to the constitutional rights 
that states are obliged to protect and provide 
minimum standards for environment, which does 
not pose an obstacle to the enjoyment of 
substantive human rights.
Whilst less common than the other approaches 
mentioned above, a few scholars claim that we 
have internationally well-established civil and 
political rights that can be strong vehicles for 
addressing environmental issues and that, in 
particular, they can foster an environmentally-
friendly political order at the domestic level [8, 
22]. Civil and political rights, very brieﬂy, can be 
deﬁned as a class of human rights that protect 
individuals' freedoms from infringement by 
governments, social organisations, and other 
private individuals [48, 49]. They restrict the 
powers of central or local governments regarding 
actions that might affect individuals and their 
rights/liberties [50]. The International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is the core 
of the legally binding human rights treaty, 
providing a range of protections for civil and 
political rights at the international level, and
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is signed by 168 state parties [51]. Civil and 
political rights may vary from country to country, 
but the most common ones include freedom to 
worship, freedom of thought and expression, the 
right to vote, to take part in political life, and to 
have freedom of assembly and association [52].
It seems that civil and political rights are not 
directly linked with EHRs or environmental 
protection, but as Boyle and Anderson [5] argue, 
the realisation of such rights, particularly the right 
to expression, association and polit ical 
participation, may enable concerned citizens to 
raise their objection to environmental harm and 
policies. These rights are not limited to 
individuals; they may also include legal 
personality or organisations. In this sense, Boyle 
[21] points out that their importance lies in their 
ability to give individuals, groups and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), who are 
affected or threatened by environmental 
degradation, the opportunity to voice their 
objections. Controversially, Dias [53] touches 
upon an important issue through his claim that 
environmental protection via civil and political 
rights is not an easy process in practice because 
they may be vulnerable to governmental control, 
which means autocratic regimes would be an 
obstacle to the enjoyment of civil and political 
rights. Indeed, this issue might be considered more 
obvious in Middle Eastern, Latin American, and 
Asian countries which suffer from the lack of a 
healthy democracy, and well-developed and 
protected human rights [54], which ultimately 
results in autocratic regimes representing the 
greatest obstacle to the enjoyment of civil and 
political rights for the protection of the 
environment. Sachs [55] underlines another issue, 
in that civil and political rights cannot be effective 
in isolation because they can only create a duty to 
refrain from certain actions that are harmful to the 
environment. He implies that they are negative 
rights that usually oblige inaction on the part of the 
government. However, arguably, he falls into the 
trap of ignoring the fact that, sometimes, the 
effective enjoyment of certain civil and political 
rights may also force government to take action 
through the allocation of appropriate resources; 
for example, if the majority of citizens exercise 
their rights against NPPs, then they may force their 
governments to invest in renewable energy 
sources instead.
Procedural rights are based on three pillars: a 
right to information, a right to participation, and a 
right to access to justice. The 1992 Rio Declaration 
is the ﬁrst international document that deﬁnes and 
fosters procedural rights which have been 
commonly conceived as being more transparent, 
inclusive, and accountable in the decision-making 
progress concerning matters affecting the 
environment that people are dependent upon. 
Principle 10 states that:
“Environmental issues are best handled with 
the participation of all concerned citizens, at the 
relevant level. At the national level, each 
individual shall have appropriate access to 
information concerning the environment that is 
held by public authorities, including information 
on hazardous materials and activities in their 
communities, and the opportunity to participate in 
decision-making processes. States shall facilitate 
a n d  e n c o u r a g e  p u b l i c  a w a re n e s s  a n d 
participation by making information widely 
available. Effective access to judicial and 
administrative proceedings, including redress and 
remedy, shall be providedˮ
Anton and Shelton [3] argues that each 
procedural right is a piece of the puzzle in building 
good environmental governance. That is, they are 
closely integrated with each other and may be 
ineffective in the absence of one or another of 
them; for example, if public authorities do not 
proactively make environmental information 
available, meaning that members of the public 
cannot exercise their right to information, the right 
to participation in decision-making processes may 
be rendered meaningless or ineffective, as 
uninformed or ill-informed citizens are not able to 
reﬂect on their thoughts in the absence of relevant 
information, and poor knowledge may affect 
people's decisions and awareness in a negative 
way [56]. From this perspective, it is reasonable to 
assert that the right to information is a prerequisite 
for effective participation. Similarly, access to 
justice is, inter alia, required to enforce the rights 
to access to information and participation [57]. 
Procedural rights, including participation in 
decision-making processes, access to information 
and access to justice are essentially recognised as 
civil and political rights by many international 
human r ights  documents .  Art icle  25 of 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which is a multilateral treaty adopted by 
the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, 
states that: “Every citizen shall have the right and 
the opportunity to take part in the conduct of  
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public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives.” Similarly, article 21 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is 
the ﬁrst time that countries agreed on a 
comprehensive statement of inalienable human 
rights, states that: “Everyone has the right to take 
part in the government of his country, directly or 
through freely chosen representatives.” Not only 
public participation but also access to information 
can be categorised as one of civil and political 
human rights. It is generally accepted that access 
to information is necessary for the realization of 
the basic rights to freedom of opinion and 
expression;  and public  part icipat ion in 
governmental activities that are guaranteed in the 
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights. 
Article 13 of American Convention on Human 
Rights, which an international human rights 
instrument adopted in 1969, states that: “Everyone 
has the right to freedom of thought and expression. 
This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in 
print, in the form of art, or through any other 
medium of one's choice.”. Similarly, access to 
justice is recognised by many constitutions 
including Brazil, Bolivia, Portugal, Kenya, and so 
on, as a fundamental right. Article 42 of the 
Constitution of Russia states that: “Everyone shall 
have the right to . . . compensation for the damage 
caused to his or her health or property by 
ecological violations” [56]. Their adoption into 
environmental governance had been achieved by 
principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration, which 
states that: “Environmental issues are best 
handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens …… each individual shall have 
appropriate access to information concerning the 
environment.” Procedural rights are, therefore, 
human rights recognised by international treaties 
and national constitutionals. 
Why are procedural rights important for 
environmental protection? Boyle and Anderson 
[5] states that procedural rights promise 
environmental protection essentially by way of 
democratic environmental governance because, as 
May [56] explains, they promote democratisation 
and concomitant rights to assemble, speak, and 
participate in governance. Lynn [57] highlights the 
importance of public participation in that ensuring 
public involvement is essential to deﬁning the 
parameters of a problem, framing the questions 
that need to be answered, deciding what 
information needs to be generated, interpreting 
such information, and choosing among available 
p u b l i c  p o l i c y  o p t i o n s  a n d  m e a n s  o f 
implementation. This results in, as Sax [58] 
argues, the most environmentally friendly 
decisions possible as the process enables 
concerned citizens to choose “what quality and 
quantity of natural resources we should be entitled 
to accessˮ. This remains a quite optimistic 
perspective, in that enjoyment of procedural rights 
may not always guarantee the most rational 
decisions in favour of the environment; ultimately, 
people may not perceive environmental beneﬁts or 
beneﬁt and cost of the decisions in a same way. For 
example, advocates of nuclear energy claim that 
NPPs are an environmentally friendly energy 
source due to negligible gas emissions in 
comparison to fossil fuel-ﬁred power stations. In 
contrast, opponents claim that NPPs are the most 
dangerous form energy to the environment due to 
the generation of radioactive wastes. So, the 
q u e s t i o n  r e m a i n s :  w h a t  i s  t h e  m o s t 
environmentally-friendly decision for NPPs? 
Each decision can be disappointing or not 
environmentally-friendly for some groups, as 
depends on their particular set of values.
On the other hand, limiting participatory 
governance to only concerned citizens seem an 
overly narrow practice. As Rose-Ackerman and 
Halpaap [59] point out, a decision in participatory 
governance is taken by such diverse groups as 
citizens, NGOs, scientists and other experts. There 
is no lack in the controversy that surrounds this in 
particular due to issues of time management. If 
participants have diverse social, political and 
environmental goals or different environmental 
values, this would represent a considerable 
obstacle to making any rapid or immediate 
decisions on any given matter. 
However, some environmental issues, such as 
nuclear accidents, require immediate action and 
quick response as radioactive contamination poses 
such a serious – indeed, potentially fatal – risk to 
human health. Another issue is that there is no 
ﬁxed rule as to what extent, or at what level, the 
public should ideally be engaged. Public 
participation in each single decision can be 
ﬁnancially costly and highly time consuming [57].
 Another advantage of procedural rights is, 
Gellers and Jeffords [60] argue, that marginalised 
groups who face an unequal  burden of 
envi ronmenta l  harm can  forward  the i r 
environmental and health concerns to other 
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people, organisations, and ofﬁcials through active 
participation in environmental decision-making, 
which is taken such as diverse groups, and indeed 
this can act as an early warning system for public 
concerns. The literature commonly addresses the 
fact that procedural rights enable even the most 
disadvantaged groups within a society, who face 
distributive justice issues, to give voice to their 
concerns, to effectively monitor and hold their 
government to account, and to enter into informed 
dialogue regarding public authority decisions [61, 
62]. In a similar sense, Lawrence et al. [63] states 
that procedural rights are a useful vehicle to reduce 
dissatisfaction with unfavourable decisions that 
result in distributive injustice. Indeed, distributive 
injustice is a visible moral issue in environmental 
matters, particularly nuclear incidents. All citizens 
beneﬁt from the electricity generated by nuclear 
stations equally but those who live close to the 
station are always more vulnerable to a potential 
nuclear accident than people who live further 
away. They may, however, stay insufﬁcient in 
addressing ecological and intergenerational 
justice issues as procedural rights do not guarantee 
any right to the non-human world and future 
generations that might also be at risk from the 
long-term consequences of nuclear accidents.
This paper has focussed on the scope and types 
of environmental human rights through an 
analysis of the related literature. Firstly, as has 
been reported above, environmental human rights 
are based on the connection between the 
environment and human rights. This relationship 
can be conceived in two different ways: the ﬁrst, 
and most common, is that the environment has 
been considered a precondition of the realisation 
and enjoyment of human rights since the 1972 
Stockholm Declaration; the second, and more 
recent, is that human rights are accepted as an 
effective means of addressing environmental 
issues that people suffer/witness, thus forcing 
public authorities to implement more sustainable 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  p o l i c i e s  a n d  t o  a f f e c t 
environmental decisions in favour of nature. From 
this perspective, it seems reasonable to say that 
EHRs are not the right to the environment for its 
own sake; rather, they are fundamental human 
rights of individuals (like the right to life and 
health) to environmental protection. 
The second conclusion is that EHRs are of four 
different types, which include the right to the 
environment, constitutional rights, civil and 
political rights, and procedural rights. The right to 
the environment, which is guaranteed by more 
than 100 countries worldwide, implies that people 
have a fundamental right to a clean/safe/healthy 
environment. The second argument is that there is 
no need for a separate right to the environment 
because this is already a prerequisite of well-
established and recognised human rights, such as 
the right to life and health; these are called 
constitutional EHRs. The third argument states 
that civil and political rights, such as the right to 
expression and protest, enable citizens to affect 
decision-making processes in an eco-friendly way. 
Lastly, procedural rights, which include the right 
to participation in decision-making processes, the 
right to have access to information, and the right to 
justice, can be an effective means of achieving the 
environmental protection that is essential to the 
realisation of human rights. These three types are, 
however, not alternatives to each other; rather, 
they are pieces of a puzzle whose ultimate aim is 
one of a truly safe environment.
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